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Abstract
Label Switching Routers (LSR),such as IP switching
of Ipsilon, use separate Virtual Circuits (VC)from
diferent sources even having the same destination.
Merging switches, on the other hand, allow multiple
VCs of upstream traffic to use a single output VC if
having same destination criteria. In this paper, we
study IP switching of Ipsilon and identi& certain
security threats. We found that oscillation between
routing and switching as a result of a malicious
frequent suspension and releasing ofjlows is a main
security threat that decreases performance of such
systems. To stabilize the performance inface of such
an attack, we propose to utilize merging switches to
mitigate the implications of oscillation in LSR. The
simulation results enhances this claim.

1. Introduction
Increasingly, the Internet is growing in size and
traflk, and is stimulating new designs of
intemetworking architecture. Some examples of
switch routers that have recently appeared as a result
of this trend are the IP switching by Ipsilon 131. the
cell switching by Toshiba, the ARIS [5] by E M , the
SITA [2] by Finland Telecom, and the tag switching
by Cisco. Sometimes this technology is referred to as
Multi-protocol Label Switching. This technology is
based on a number of criteria's that forms a special
mechanism for establishing and terminating data
transmissions. The first criteria is that, packetsare
switched in the hardware level after being routed for a
time through software level. This establishes a Virtual
Circuit through which the data is transmitted by the
hardware speed. Second criteria is that, the connection
is teared down when the switch does not notice data
transmission for a specific period of time. Third
criteria is that cells of a fragmented packet are
accumulated in a buffer till a cell with an indication of
end of packet arrives where the packet as a whole can
be forwarded to the specific VC. The loss or the
0-7695-1165-1/01$10.00
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tamper of this cell has illusive indication for stream
continuation. These unique proprietary mechanism of
IP switch namely: cut through, tear down and End of
Packet indication are a potential security flawsfor
such a system that could be a source for a number of
scenarios for denial of service attack. The other
objective of this paper that we try to address is. it is
possible to solve 'certain security problems using
different approaches other than the tradtional ones.
For example, we proposed to use a new sort of
switches that have the capability of merging virtual
connections to alleviate the impact of denial of service
on the non-merge switches that are used in the label
switch routers.

This paper is organized as follows. First, in section 2
we give general description and necessary background
for label switching technology and proposed solution.
Then we focus on the oscillation problem as a main
security threat in Ip switching, while in section 4 we
propose a remedy for such a threat.

2. Label Switching Illustrated
Internet Protocol (P)suite provides the foundation
for the current data communication infrastructure. IP
protocols have proven to be very flexible due to their
connectionless nature and have been deployed
widely over the past two decades. Additionally, they
dominate
current
network
technology.
Asynchronous Transfer mode (ATM). on the other
hand can provide integrated services of media types
and different bits rates. It offers unprecedented
scalability and cost performance as well as the ability
to reserve network resources for real-time oriented
t r a c and support for multi-point communication.
Both network technologies, IP and ATM, have their
strengths and weaknesses. For instance, one
limitation of ATA4 networks has been the relatively
large gap between the speed of the network data
paths and that of control operations needed to
configure those data paths to meet changing users'

needs. IP’s greatest strength- on the other han4 is its
inherent flexibility and its capacity to adapt rapidly
to changmg conditions. These complementary
strengths and limitations make it natwal to combine
IF’ with ATM to form a natural alliance that
combines the best aspects of both technologies.

does not have to be routed (atlayer3). InCached
Switched Virtual Circuits, circuit time-outis 20
seconds. Virtual circuits that are idle for longer than
this amount of time are cached for future re-use.
After 300 seconds (5 minutes) for example, of idle
time, they are tom down [9]. If a switch has already
established a VC for a flow to the same destination
then the merge switch may use this VC to direct the
flow. Provided an optimal, fair and efficient
scheduling algorithm is used in merging, VC switch
merging in general reduces call setup time for
establishmg a VC in a switch and hence saves switch
resources

The marriage of both technologies promises to
deliver a robust network technology. Label
Switching is the general term for this technology. It
is based on the integration of layer 2 (Data link
layer) and layer 3 (Network layer ) datagram labels
to provide a high speed cut through mechanism for
layer 3. ( i.e. shift routing to layer 2 with higher
speed) see Figure 1. In Label Switching ,rather than
examining and analyzing each header at each router,
the router will examine the label assigned to the
packet at hardware level, thereby acceleratingthe
forwarding process.

Thls approach is useful because it (1) reduces the
label space at each switch, (2) saves setup time to
establish a VC ( 3 ) reduces the number of VC’s and
(4) reduces the pricing cost for call setup of a virtual
circuit.
Widjaja et al. in [l] described the specificationof
implementing VC mergmg in switch from two
directions: the hardware and the performance
implication. They concluded that the overhead of VC
merging in terms of the additional buffer requirement
is minimal contrary to the widespread belief. The
results claimed that the overhead decreases as
utilization increases. or as the W i c becomes more
burst. Based on simulation results, the study
encourages deploying such switches. provided a fair,
optimal and efficient scheduhg algorithm is used.

Merging Flows in LSR
Consider a VC that has already been established to a
certain destination with certain QoS parameters.
Then if another flow with the same destination and
specification raised from an ingress having the same
destination label. even from a different source, then
it is possible to merge the flows at the switch to form
a joint egress stream. The idea is in caching the VC
in switch memory so that the next cells appearance
of the suspended flow, recogmzed by flow identifier,

IP table
map IP routes
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information
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1

Layer 2 switching

Layer 3 routing

Figure 1. ( depicted from [11)
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3. Security Threats on label Switching
Networks
We will consider IP Switching of Ipsilon as case
study of a MPLS network, and as the best ofour
knowledge, there is no relative work similar to this
case study. As mentioned before that IP switchmg
employs a special mechanism for establishing a
connection and forwarding IP packets as well as
adopting a special mechanism for cutting through and
tearing down a connection. Due to the space
limitation we will focus in partxular on the cutthrough mechanism and study its security
implications.

Oscillation
The decision to flip from routing to switching,
i.e.“cut-through” , so the data will no longer be
routed, is a crucial one and depends on the classifier
mechanism adopted in the switch. see Figure 1 (b).
The cut-through occurs when the LSR encountersa
long flow and decides after N number of packets to
switch the traffic at layer 2 after being routed at layer
3. On the other hand, the flow “tears-down” if it
encounters a gap or delay of packet arrival after a T
amount of time. We define the phenomena of
frequent flipping from routing to switchmg and from
snitching to routing as Oscillation. Oscillation may
be caused by malicious suspending (blocking) of
datagrams flowing. For example, consider a long
lasting application such as http file that is forwarded
through an IP switch of X/Y classifier. The switch
may decide after forwarding N packets to cutthrough. Suppose an attacker, is siting between an IP
host and a switch ,acting as a gate, and deliberately
blocking the flow through the switch for a time T
equals to time set in the switch that is required to tear
down a VC connection. This action causes the VC to
tear down whle the actual application flow has not
yet been terminated. The suspended flow will be
released later and the LSR will start routing it again
for a given number of packets N, and decides to cutthrough, the flow will then be suspended for a T
time, the VC will tear-down and so forth. This
phenomena has severe implications on the
performance of the IP switch especially onthose
switches with a short timeout tear-down period and
small number of packets to cut through. It causes
“Oscillation” between routing and switching.
The other source of oscillation is TP Header
Tampering. Port classifiers and protocol classifiers
528

depend on the port number and UDP or TCP
information in deciding whether to establish a VC.
Tampering port numbers, from example, from 80 to
25, results changing flow nature from a long lasting
flow (http) to a short lasting flow (smtp). This results
routing a long lasting flow (layer 3) rather than
switching it( layer 2). The switches that have a direct
link to an IP sources (host or router) are most likely to
face this attack, because these switches are the ones
that take the decision to switch cells and to send
lFMP cut-through messages to the next switch.

4. Proposed Security Scheme
To handle oscillation caused by blocking or
suspending flows, we e‘xploit the merging criteria of
the merge switch and enhance security by reducing
the implication of such an attack. The readermay
noticed that we have used the word ‘reduce‘ rather
than ‘eliminate’, because the proposed scheme does
not address to solve the problem. Rather, we attempt
to ‘alleviate’ the implications of such an attack by
using merge switches in the LSR. The basic idea is
that when a new flow enters a switch and it happen
that a previous flow had already established aVC
with the same flow specification and destination, then
the IP switch does not have to route the packet, but
rather switch them directly to the same VC at layer 2.
By ths way, the oscillation attack is better handled in
contrast to non-merge switches.
To study the implication of oscillation problem on the
performance of both merge switch and non-merge
switches, we ran a simulation program and set a
comparison. We fixed the forwarding processing time
for both type of switches based on assumption that
both have relatively similar processing time [11. We
created dfferent stream flows (data, audio and video)
on both switches and mimicked the scenariointhe
previous section. Both flows of the different sources
are destined to the same destination. We assume that
one of the flows is subject to denial of service by an
attacker who blocks the flow on frequent basis equals
the time needed to tear down an established VC and
release the flow after the connection is teared down.
The goal is to study the performance of the switches
in such sort of attacks as described in section 3.

Simulation Study
Simulation results are summarized in two graphs
given in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Each point inthe
graphs is the average of 10 simulation runs at

different data releasing times introduced by the
attacker. The data releasing time was changed from 1
to 10 seconds and the utilization’s of layer 2 and layer
3 were determined by simulating the system for the
non-merge and merge switches. The time between the
arrivals of data packets was assumed to exponential
with mean 0.08 milliseconds. The processingtimes
were fixed at 0.01 and 0.04 milliseconds for layer 2
and layer 3 respectively. It was assumed that the data
flow was cut through at 5 mnds.Figure2shows
that as the attacker releasing time increases from 1
second to 10 seconds, the utilization of layer 2 also
increases steadily for both types of switching, namely
non-merge and merge cases. This implies that as the
attacker increases the releasing time, he will be able to
make layer 2 more and more busy. On the other hand,
Figure 3 shows how layer 3 in the non-merge case
reacts to the release time of the attacker. It is
interesting that in the merge switch case; layer 3 has
no effect at all with respect to the release time of the
attacker. There will not be any oscillation for the same
flow duration. In non-merging case however, layer 3
is affected until the release time is equal tothecut
through time. We can conclude that if the cut through
time is decreased, the utilization of layer 2 is
increased and thus more and more data is processed.

I

1q

Releasing time basis (sec.)

Figure 3.
Another obvious advantage of this scheme is
apparent in reducing the number of labels and keys. In
order for a merge switch to be used with
cryptographic unit, their must exist a mechanism
between the Crypt Unit and the Merging Unit to enable the Crypt Unit to assign Merent keys to the
traf€ic when the output buffer is assigned with t r m c
of Werent destinations. In the case of merge switch,
the cryptographicunit will use the same key for a new
flow as the key that was used for the earlier
established connection, thus reducing key pool size.
This contrasts with the non-merge switch, where each
VC has a different key even with VC’s that have the
same destinations. Besides, the key-agile unit has to
work fast enough to change keys to keep
synchronized with cell transmission.

5. Conclusion
New technology brings with it unprecedented
security threats, and IP switching is relativelynew
technology that its security was investigatedinthis
paper. We have described and simulated the ‘‘
oscillation” attack and suggested to enhance the
security in IP switching of Ipsilon against sucha
threat using merging switches. Simulation results on
merge switches shows how it alleviates the
implication of such an attack.

Releasingtime basis (sec.)

Figure 2.
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